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THE ALLISON SOCIETY.
During the past month the society has
been exceedingly prosperous, its meetings
have been well attended, and much interest shown in the work by the members.
The outgoing administration of President
Valentine has been very successful, while
the new board of officers, headed by President Harpel, have shown much commendable vigor and energy.
Through the earnest work of the joint
committee of the two societies, arrangements have at last been completed for the
inter-society debate, and among the members of the Allison society the report of the
committee was received enthusiastically.
Messrs. Piper, Harpel and Bolte, the Allison committee in charge of arrangements,
have conducted their preparation with
skill and good judgment.
The question for debate will be, "Resolved, That those combinations among
manufacturers, which are commonly
known as trusts, are detrimental to the
public welfare."
The debaters first elected to represent
the society were Messrs. Lentz and Prince,
ir. Rothermel, alternate. The two gentlemen first named finding it impossible
to serve, a special meeting was called on

Tuesday, March 6, 1900, and a new election held, which resulted in Messrs. Rothermel and Valentine being chosen as
Allison debaters, Kline as alternate.
The regular election of the society was
held on Friday, February 23d, and the
new board of officers elected is:
President-Harpel.
Vice President-Bolte.
Secretary-Nicholls.
Treasurer-Alexander.
Executive Committee-Elmes, Valentine and Piper.
Much valuablepractice has beenafforded
in extemporaneous speech during the
month, in every meeting members having
been called on for impromptu remarks.
At tie meeting of February 16th, a
thoughtful oration was given by Mr. E.
W. Brock, on "The Call to the Nation."
By courtesy of the Dickinson society,
the members have attended two interesting lectures:
On March 2nd, by Prof. C. F. Himes,
on "Scientific Expert Testimony."
On -March 16th, by Attorney Jos. Shapley, on "Professional Duties."
Mr. Valentine, on behalf of the Executive Committee, announced that Prof. F.
C. Woodward would lecture on "Lord
Mansfield" on Friday, March 23d.
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THE DICKINSON SOCIETY.

The Dickinson Society has now entered
upon the fourth administration of this
school year. The same interest and zeal
is manifest among its members as was perceptible during the first meetings- of the
school year, in which meetings only too
often there is a great degree of earnestness,
while the following meetings suffer from
indifference and ennui.
On the Friday evenings of March 3rd
and March 16th, lectures were held under
the auspices of this society, an account of
which will be found under another head.
The executive committee had made arrangements with Mr. Rupley, ex-District
Attorney of Cumberland County, to lecture
before the Dickinson and the Allison
Societies on Friday evening, March 9th.
Unfortunately Mr. Rupley became ill.in
Philadelphia but the day before that date,
and the lecture had to be postponed, much
to the regret of the members of the School.
Under this disappointment the society
went into session, but spent the evening
very profitably in impromptu speeches as
follows:
"The situation in South Africa," Mr.
Henderson.
"Should Quay be seated? " Mr. Trude.
"Should Senators be elected by popular
vote?" Mr. Shellenberger.
"Should a lawyer enter polities?" Mr.
Davis.
"Is the war agafnst the Philippines unjust?" Mr. Minnich.
"Should the illiterate vote?" Mr. J.,
Rhoads.
"Should the United States accjuire the
land on which to build the Nicaragua Canal?" Mr. F. Rhoads.
The following newly elected officers took
their positions on Friday, March 2nd:
President-W. T. Stauffer.
Vice-President-W. S. Clark.
Secretary-E. T. Daugherty.
Executive Committee-H. P. Katz, H.
S. Wilack and C. S. Davis.
Treasurer-G. W. Aubrey.
District Attorney-John N. Minnich.
Sheriff-R. H. Moon.
Sergeant-at-Arms-W. H. Trude.
Prothonotary-M. J. Ryan.
Warden-H. J. Shellenberger.
Clerk of Court-H. L. Henderson.

Constable-C. S. Davis.
Register of Wills-W. T. Osborne.
WEORCAN CLUB.
The Weorcan Club has now entered
upon the third administration within its
short but interesting history. Besides the
reading of Hamlet, which is still contin ued, the following features were found on
the programmes of the past month:
"A talk on practical oratory," G. A.
Bolte.
"Why the South will be thd'industrial
centre of the future," Aaron Light.
"The material facts of the CarnegieFrick case," L. M. Sebring.
"English
Pronunciation," W. T.
Stauffer.
Impromptu debate on the question,
"esolved, That United States Senators
should be elected by popular vote.' Discussed. affirmatively by Messrs. Collins,
Hess and Bolte,. and negatively by Messrs.
Sebring, Stauffer and Coblentz.
The following officers were elected on
Wednesday,'March 14th:
President--G. A. Bolte.
Vice-President-W. H. Taylor.
Secretary-L. F. Hess.
Oritic--W. T. Stauffer.
Executive Committee-H. W. Russel,
H. l. Collins and A. Light.
LECTURE BY DR; HIMES.
One of the most instructive and masterly lectures delivered before the Law
School during this school year was given
by Dr. Himes, under the auspices of the
Dickinson Society, on Friday evening,
March 2nd. Prof. Himes is one of the most
prominent persons in the Cumberland
Valley. He hag served both ag professor
and as President in the Dickinson College,
and is the author of several articles on the
subject of "Scientific Expert Testimony,"
which was also the subject of his lecture
before the school.
After a reference to the prominent part
which scientific expert testimony played
in the famous Dreyfus and Molineux
cases, Dr. Himes advised all lawyers to
watch Well the scientific expert, and to
avail themselves of him when possible,
showing how he is growing in importance
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in our rapidly advancing civilization.
He then showed how the idea of the
sientific expert gradually developed in
our system of jurisprudence-a system
which is so careful in exacting the best
evidence, and which so persistently refuses
to allow witnesses to state anything but
fact, and excludes their opinions. He
showed how, in considering the subjects
of science, skill and trade, both the rule of
best evidence and the necessities of the
case demand that scientific experts be admitted, and that their opinions be received
as evidence.
He lamented the fact that few, if any,
safeguards are thrown around the perfectly
human nature of the scientific expert; and
defended the scientific expert, showing
that he, unlike the attorney, who, with
him, is the object of much unjust criticism, is seldom found on the side against
his own convictions, and that whatever
mistakes of judgment he may make, he is,
at least, always candid.
He closed with a recommendation for
definite legislation upon this subject. Prof.
Himes' suggestion as to legislation includes three things: First, the formation
of a stricter definition of what the scientific expert is. Second, the abolition of
the hypothetical case. Third, a rule that
in no case shall a witness be required to
answer "yes" or "no," if such answer in
his opinion would be misleading.
It is needless to say that such legislation, which is, we believe, endorsed by
Judge Endlich, would be of inestimable
good both to the profession and to the furtherance of public justice.
MR. SHAPLEY'S LECTURE.
The Law School was again, entertained
on Friday evening, March 16th, by a lecture, this time by Mr. Joseph Shapley, a
rising young attorney of Shippensburg.
Mr. Shapley is a graduate of the School,
and is recognized as one of the prominent
young members of this bar. Mr. Shapley
chose for his subject 1'Professional Duties,"
wisely preferring to discuss a subject of
practical importance to those, who would
shortly enter the legal profession, rather
than to dwell upon some legal subject,
knowledge of which can be learned from
the books. The lecture was filled with

sound advice to attorneys to be. Only a
short synopsis of which can be given at
this place.
Mr. Shapley strongly condemned the
practice of pettifoggers and shysters, and
others whose sole object for practicing the
law seems to be to make money, rightly
asserting that the law was made for the
protection and enforcement of right, and
not for the emolument of attorneys, and
that the desire to gain should always be
secondary to the desire for the good of the
client. He next strongly urged assiduous
and persevering study of the law, as success
awaits only those who have a thorough
knowledge of the law, and this knowledge
can be gained only by close application
and untiring effort. He also advised
young lawyers to cultivate the friendship
of other members of the bar, especially
that of its older attorneys, and never tobe
lacking in that respect which is due to the
seniors and which can be of no detriment
to the client, whom to serve is one of the
first duties of an attorney. In conclusion
he urged open and fair dealing with other
lawyers,and especially with the court, who
always respects frankness and sincerity.
The remarks of Mr. Shapley, which
were, it is needless to say, very opportune,
were greatly appreciated by the "boys"1
coming from one not so many years their
senior, and who still can realize the difficulties Tying in the way of a young attorney.

ALUMNI NOTES.
Frank H. Fay, of the class of '96, visited
Carlisle in the early part of this month.
He is at present practicing in Hollidaysburg.
Richard J. Goodall, '96, spent a short
time in town recently.
John E. Small, '97, is at present practicing law in Shamokin. He visited Carlisle
during the month.
DELTA CIR FRATERNITY.
The Fraternity gave a smoker on Friday, March 16th. Mr. Joseph Shapley,
who had lectured to the literary societies
earlier in the evening, was present and entertained the members with a few anecdotes and a speech.
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We regret to announce the death of
James F. Santee, of the class of '96. Since
1897 he had been employed in the prothonotary's office of Luzerne county.
During last.January he contracted asevere
cold. Tuberculosis resulted, and he died
at his home in Witpwallopen on Monday,
March 19th.

2. What is a reasonable time within
which buyer should offer to return is a
question for the jury. Boothby et al. v.
Scales, 27 Wis. 626.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Campney contracted with Andrews &
Co. to supply him with a set of books not
yet issued, for the price of $60, of which
$10 must be paid down, and the remainder
in monthly installments of $2. The contract stipulates that the title shall remain
in Andrews & Co. until full payment -is
MOOT COURT.
made. It also impliedly authorizes the
making of complaints against the books,
ANDREWS & BARNES vs. CAMPbut only within three days after the deNEY.
livery of them. Campney received the
Conditional sale--Right of vendee to re.- books, made no complaints against them
within three days, nor until two months
scind.
had elapsed, when he notified Andrews &
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Co. that he was dissatisfied with them,
A and B are partners. C is an indi- and offered to return them, paying the
expressage and forfeiting the $10 already
vidual, and he gives A and B an order for
a set of books not yet issued. They are paid.
This is an action for the price upon the
issued, and he pays $10 on account of the
contract. The only conditions that afbill-of $60, remainder to be paid monthly
fected the contract were one in favor of
at the rate of $2 per month. The bill of
the vendee, and one in favor of the vendor.
sale provides that if complaint against
The latter retained the "title" until the
the books is made, it must be within
payment was completed, and probably the
three days. The bill also contains this
right to resume possession on default. The
clause: "The title to remain in A and B
former might return any books against
until full payment be made." In two or
which he made substantial complaints, if
three months C becomes dissatisfied with
the books as not being what it was repre- he made them within three days. Complaints were not made within three, nor
sented they would be, notifies A and B to
that effect, and offers to return them, pay- within thirty, nor within sixty days. The
stipulation was entirely reasonable, and
ing expressage and losing the $10 paid. A
no right to reject the books now exists.
and B refuse, and sue.
SE13RING and O'KEEFE for the plaintiff. Of.Tiedeman, Sales, 322.
The monthly installments have not been
I. The failure of defendant to refuse
within the specified time is a waiver of paid, and probably Andrews & Co. might
the right. Butler et al.v. School District,
have brought replevin, if necessary, to re149 Pa. 351.
possess themselves of the books. Levan
2. The "title clause" does not confer an
v. Wilton, 185 Pa. 64; North v. Williams,
option on defendant to return. It is intended only as additional security for the 120 Pa. 109. Had they done so, they
Would have been supposed to elect to replaintiff. Geist v. Stier, 134 Pa. 216; Conwell v. Manning, 3 Forum 105; Appleton
scind the contract, and would havelost
v. Norwalk Literary Corp., 53 Conn. 4.
the right to prosecute a suit upon the con3. Plaintiff has a right of action for
tract for the price. Seanor v. McLaughbreach of the contract, or he may sue for
each installment as it comes due. Clarke
lin, 165 Pa. 150; Campbell v. Hickok, 140
v. Dill, 9 Conn. 820, and cases above cited.
Pa. 290; Scott v. Hough, 151 Pa. 630. But
SHAPFER and SLbAN for the defendant.
they have not repossessed themselves of
1. Delivery and acceptance do not neces- the books. On the contrary, they have
sarily constitute such acceptance as will
refused to receive them from Campney,
defeat the right to reject. Hare on Contracts, 543; Tiedeman on Sales, 277; Hast- who has offered to return them at his own
ings v. Lovering, 2 Pick. 215; 115 U. S.
charge, and to forfeit the $10 already paid.
363.
That the vendor has the option to retake
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or to sue for the price, all the cases concede, unless he contractually confifies himself to the formpr. Cf. Conwell v. Mlanning, 3 Forum 105. Campney promised
to pay the $60. What has occurred to
discharge him?' Did the simultaneous
reservation by the vendors of the right of
rescission? Surely not. Has the exercise
of that right? But it has not been exercised. The defendant is complaining because it has not been.
We sce no reason to disturb the verdict
of the jury, and the motion for a new trial
is overruled.
RICHARD ROE vs. JOHN DOE.
Covenantin case-Landlord'sliabilityfor
defective building.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

John Doe is the owner of a vacant lot.
Richard Roe is the proprietor of a livery
stable. They come together, and Roe
tells Doe that he wants a stable suitable
for carryingon his business. Itmusthave
four floors, the basement and second floor
to be fitted with stalls for horses, the first
or ground floor for the storage of carriages
and other vehicles, and the third floor for
hay, grain and carriages.
Sept. 1, 1898, a lease is signed, wherein
Doe lets for ten years, beginning January
1, 1899, the said lot, with a building to be
erected thereon for livery stable purposes,
"to be built and ready for occupancy in
accordance with the plans and specifications prepared by Adam Jones, an architect." The lease provides that all repairs
shall be made by the lessee. The specifications are for a livery stable barn, consisting of four floors, a basement with
stalls for horses, the first or ground floor
for storage of carriages and other vehicles,
the second floor with stalls for horses, and
the third floor for hay, grain and carriages.
The specifications provide that "the floors
of the first and second stories will be of
No. 1 Southern pine, two inches thick,
surfaced and grooved for a hardwood
tongue of oakqand both groove and tongue
to be -well painted with white lead and
linseed oil before being nailed, then all to
be well nailed. TheUse floors to be watertight.")
The lessor made a contract with John

Smith for.building the stable. The same
was completed in due time, and occupied
by the tenant. Owing to the fact that the
floor of the second story had not been
properly constructed, in that the grooves
and tongues had not been painted, and
because of other defects, the floor was not
water-tight, and urine and water charged
with ammonia from the stalls dripped
through the floor and upon the carriages
stored upon the first floor, causing damage
to the lessee of $2,000 for repainting and
upholstering; also causing the loss of the
use of the carriages; also causing customers to take the horses and carriages
elsewhere for boarding and stabling, to the
damage of the plaintiff to the extent of
$1,000.
The builder and architect are supposed
to have been competent men.
The action is brought in trespass.
Defendant pleads "not guilty. ' ?
Queries: Should the action have been
assumpsit ?
How many of the elements of damage
claimed are recoverable?
HARPEI and POINTS for the plaintiff.
1. We ask to have the action amended
to "assumpsit," under Statute 2, P. & L.
Dig. 3634.
2. The damages claimed are the natural
and proximate results of defendant's
breach of the contract, and he is therefor
liable. Fairbanks v. Kerr& Smith. 10 Pa.
86; Pa. R. R. Co. v. Hope, 80 Pa. 373;
Pittsburg City v. Grier, 22 Pa. 54; Dickinson v. Boyle, 18 Pick. 18.
COLLINS and BuCK for the defendant.
1. The lessor employed competent contractors, and he is not liable to others for
the results of their negligence. Oil Co. v.
Gilson, 63 Pa. 146; Painterv. City of Pittsburg, 46 Pa. 213; Harrison v. Collins, 86
Pa. 153.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Although this action was instituted by
a writ in trespass, and the declaration is
in form a declaration in trespass, the cause
of action therein set forth is clearly one in
assumpsit. If the defendant were charged
with negligence, it might perhaps be contended that trespass would not be an improper form of action. But there is no
allegation of negligence here, and it is
conceded that the defendant exercised due
care in the selection of his architect and
contractor. The plaintiff's cause ofaction
is founded solely upon the breach of a
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covenant in his lease, and that it is one in
assumpsit is a proposition so clear as to
make the citation of authority unnecessary. The defendant might therefore
have demurred to the declaration, but he
plead "not guilty," and the case coming
on for trial the court permitted the plaintiff to amend by changing the form of his
action, and the defendant to change his
plea to "non-assumpsit." This appears to
have been the proper practice under Act
of 1871, May 10, P. L. 265, 1. See Smith
v. Bellows, 77 Pa. 441 ; Tyrrill v. Lamb,
96 Pa. 464.
The only remaining question relates to
the measure of damages. In the application of the familiar rule of proximate
cause laid down by Alderson B. in Hadley
v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. Rep., it has frequently been held that loss of profits resulting from the breach of a contract is
recoverable when such loss may be reasonably supposed to have been in the contemplation of the parties as a probable
result of a breach. Pittsburg Coal Co. v.
Foster, 59 Pa. 365 ; Wade v. Haycock,. 25
Pa. 382; Adams Express Co. v. Egbert, 12
Casey 364; Schlitz Brewing Co. v. McCann,
21 W. X. C. 244; Booth v. Rolling Mill
Co., 60 N. Y. 487; Dixon-Woods Co. v.
Phillips Glass Co., 169 Pa. 167.
The great difficulty is to determine in
each case whether the profits may be
reasonably supposed to have been in the
contemplation of the parties. Many of
the authorities are hard to reconcile, and
it would be of little value to discuss them
here. In the light of those which we have
already cited, however, it is our opinion
that the plaintiff in the case before us
should be allowed to recover for the loss of
custom resulting from the breach of the
covenant, in case he is able to show with
sufficient certainty the extent of his loss.
At the time the contract was made the
defendant knew that the building was to
be used for livery stable purposes, and that
the carriages of the plaintiff and of his
customers were to be kept on the first
floor, and the horses, or at least some of
them, on the floor above. Inview of this
arrangement, it was expressly covenanted
that the floors should be water-tight. The
only purpose in making them so was to
keep the room on the first floor dry and
clean, so that it might be suitable for the

storage of the carriages owned by plaintiff
and his customers. Defendant was fully
informed of that purpose, and must have
appreciated the importance of his covenant
and the extent of the damage that would
probably result from its breach. The leaking of urine from thestable-room upon the
carriages below would make the carriageroom practically useless, and a temporary
withdrawal of custom would be inevitable. To say that the parties had such
withdrawal of custom, and consequent loss
of profits to plaintiff in mind as the probable result of a breach of the covenant, is
certainly not unreasonable.
It is true that the value of the custom
lost is not capable of precise ascertainment. The rule is satisfied, however, if
the extent of the loss be made reasonably
definite. For that purpose evidence is
admissible to show the percentage of
plaintiff's profits, and the extent to which
his receipts were affected, and from such
evidence the jury should be permitted to
estimate the extent of the resulting loss.
Schlitz v. McCann, 21 W. N. C. 244. If,
however, the evidence is not reasonably
definite, the question of loss of profits
should not be permitted to go to the jury.
The defendant's objection to the plaintiff's offer to show loss of profits must be
overruled.
McFARLANE vs. SHENANDOAH R.
R. CO.
Common carrierof passengers--Damages
-Proximate cause-Negligence.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The plaintiff engaged passage on the
defendant company's line to a station
called Ashley,Centre county, Pa. Through
the negligence of the defendant company's
servant, plaintiff was carried to Bala. The
distance from Bala to Ashley by road was
seven miles, by rail a mile and a half. It
was iiight time, and very cold and dark,
with flurries of snow, and no dwellings
near. The plaintiff decided to walk back
by rail. While on the way, without fault
on the part of either the plaintiff or the
defendant company, the plaintiff was
struck by a locomotive and injured. He
was als) frost bitten. He seeks to recover
both for the injury and for the frost bite
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The jury finds a special verdict of $500
damages for the injury and $300 for the
frost bite; subject to the point reserved by
the court, whether, in law, the plaintiff
can recover on either count.
And now, October 1, 1899, opinion of the
trial judge filed, motion for new trial refused, andjudgment entered on the verdict
for the plaintiff against the defendant for
the sum of $800. Judgment, $800.
October 18, 1899, defendant filed his recognizance in the sum of $2,000 for the
purpose of an appeal in the Superior Court.
October 20th writ of certiorari from the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania to the
Court of Common Pleas of Centre county,
requiring record of the above stated case
to be certified and sent to the said Superior
Court, in pursuance of the defendant company's appeal.
WINLACK and YEAGER for the plaintiff.
1. The plaintiff should recoverfor: (a)
The negligence of the defendant was the
cause of the plaintiff's injury. Hobbs v.
London, etc., R. R. Co., 10 Q. B. 111;
Stutz v. R. R., 73 Wis. 147; Winker v. R.
R., 21 Mo. App. 99; Brown v. R. R., 54
Wis. 342. (b) The plaintiff was notguilty
of contributory negligence. Lord JEllenborough, in Jones v. Boyce, 1 Stakk, 493.
Cf. also the finding of the jury below.
PIPER and HEIST for the defendant.
1. The plaintiff cannot recover for: (a)
His injuries were not the proximate result
of defendant's negligence. Hoag & Alger
v. R. R-. Co., 85 Pa. 293; Buntingv. Hogsett, 139 Pa. 363; Haverty v. R. R. Co.,
135 Pa. 50. (b) He is guilty of contributory negligence in choosing a dangerous
route in preference to a safe one. R. R.
Co. v. Burney, 71 Pa. 391; R. R1. Co. v.
Aspell, 23 Pa. 147. (c) He was a trespasser. Kay v. R. R. Co., 15 P. F. Smith
300; McMullen v. R. R. Co., 132 Pa. 107;
Mitchell v. R. R. Co., 132 Pa. 226.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.

The express contract with McFarlane
was to carry him to Ashley. The implied
contract was to stop the train at that point
long enough to allow him, after proper
notice of his arrival, to descend. The company having carried him to Ashley, failed
to give him the opportunity to dismount
at that place, and carried him a mile and
a half beyond to Bala. In this it violated
the contract and neglected its duty, and
for the consequences it must respond to
him in damages. The damagesfor which
compensation is claimed are of two sorts.

McFarlane was frost-bitten while walking
back to Ashley. He was also run into by
a locomotive, and thus injured. May he
recover indemnity for these?
Let us first consider the frost-bite. It
does not appear what the exigency was
which required McFarlane to reach Ashley
on the night of his travel on the road. He
would ordinarily have no right to incur
the danger of frost-bite, or other personal
injury, and impose theliability for it upon
the company. Had it seemed to him that
he was running a serious risk, and had
the necessity of his reaching Ashley not,
been urgent, he should have remained at
Bala, if he could have found accommodation there. But nothing instructs us
whether such accommodation might have
been found, or whether serious risk was
obvious in undertaking to return to Ashley, or whether the need of that return
was so great that the taking of such risk
was unavoidable. We are not to presume
negligence or rashness on the part of
McFarlane, and we shall therefore assume
that his effort to get to Ashley was justifiable.
McFarlane chose the track of the railroad, which was but one mile and a half
in length, to the highway, which was
seven miles long. The probability is that
the injury from the frost would have been
much severer had he been exposed to'it
for the longer period. The selection of the
railroad track can furnish no reason for
denying compensation to him for the results of the cold.
The season was winter, the weather was
cold. No sun mitigated itsseverity. That
injury should result from exposure to it
was not so improbable or rare that it
might not properly have been anticipated.
Hobbs v. London, etc., Railway Co., L.
R., 10 Q. B. 111; Cf. Brown v. Chicago,
etc., Railway Co., 54 Wis. 342; Williams
v. Vanderbilt, 28 N. Y. 217. The defendant is liable to make good to the plaintift
the injury arising from the cold.
We are now to consider the injury resulting from the collision with the locomotive. It has been found in the trial
court that the collision occurred without
the fault of either party. It was then
not traceable to an improper presence of
M Farlane on the track, or to his neglect
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of the due precautions against accident.
He must have been alert; have watched
and listened, and properly heeded the
signs of an approaching locomotive. He
is not to be deprived of indemnity for colliding with it because of negligence, for he
was not negligent; or because he was a
trespasser, for it has been found that he
was not a trespasser.
On the other hand, the railroad company was not negligent in the operation
of its locomotive. Had it been, this negligence would have been a separate ground
of liability, if the presence of McFarlane
on the track was not trespass, and did not
for that reason deprive him of redress.
Does the absence of negligence on the part
of the defendant in the collision excuse
the defendant?
We have seen that the railroad is liable
for the results of the primal wrong, of not
allowingsIcFarlane to dismount, although
these results are brought about by impersonal forces of nature. It would have
been equally liable had they come from
the concurrent, innocent acts of other men.
The actual injuries resulted from the
primary fault of the defendant, and the
co-operation of its secondary but innocent
act. We are unable to think that the
company is excused, because without this
co-operation the hurt would not have followed.
It may be well to add to what we have
already said, a remark upon the right of
McFarlane to walk upon the track. The
-company having undertaken to let him off
at Ashley, neglected to do so. The circumstances may have made it imperative
that he should reach Ashley that night,
and may have made the use of the defendant's track' reasonable. The jury has so
found. We are not able to say that the
verdict in this respect is in excess of the
evidence.
A similar remark may be made upon the
suggestion that it was negligent to walk
upon the track, and thus encounter the
risk of a collision with a locomotive. The
jury have found that the collision was
without McFarlane's fault. This negatives negligence or wrong in the selection
of the railway track as a route, and we
cannot say that such negation was, under
the evidence, unreasonable.
Judgment affirmed.

COBB & CO., vs. AMOS CURRY.
Fraud-Surety.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Win. Jones was treasurer and bookkeeper of Cobb & Co., partners in the
wholesale dry goQds business, from Jan.
1st, 1891, to Aug. 13, 1897. At the latter
date, it was discovered that he had misappropriated $379 of the firm, and had
also, in its name, endorsed a draft payable
to it of $750, the money for which he had
likewise not charged himself with. He
explained these circumstances to Cobb &
Co., who, satisfied that he had had no in-tention ultimately to defraud them, agreed
to waive the wrong and continue him in
their employ until Jan. 1st, 1899, if he
would furnish surety in the sum of $20,000,
and pay the expense of a quarterly examination of his books by an expert. This
he agreed to and he obtained a bond from
Curry to Cobb & Co., conditioned for the
faithful performance of Jones' duties, and
the "full accounting for all moneys that
have come or hereafter shall come into the
hands of the said Jones, so long as he shall
be employed by the said Cobb & Co.II
The day before this bond was given,
Jones had embezzled $125, and within a
week afterwards he embezzled a negotiable
note for $275. This last defalcation, discovered two weeks subsequently, was followed by Jones' instant dismissal. When
Curry became surety the reputation of
Jones was, and always had been, of the
highest. Hewas universally esteemed as
a capable, honest, sober, industrious and
religious man, and Curry shared the general opinion, having no knowledge of the
affairs between Jones and Cobb & Co.
Action on the bond, for recovery of 400.
TAYLOR (WAIxER) and MCCONNELL
for the plaintiff.
1. The defendant is bound by the bond
for (a) mere ignorance on the part of the
security about any particular subject affecting the contract is no defense against
it. Life Ins. Co. v. Clinton, 66 N. Y. 326;
McWillihms v. Mason, 31 N. Y. 294; Roper
v. Sangamon Lodge, 91 Ill. 518; F. N.
Bank v. Branden. 22 Atl. Rep. 1045, (b)
The only fraud permissible to be proved is
fraud touching the execution of the instrunient. George v. Tate, 102 U. S. 564,
(c) The surety must have contemplated
past defaults, for he makes himself ex-
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pressly liable for them. State v. Jones, 89
Mo. 470.
ROTHERMEL and OSBORNE for the defendant.
1. The bond is invalid and defendant
cannot be held liable for (a) Neglect by
party taking a bond for good conduct of
an employee to inform the surety of past
criminal conduct of said employee is such
fraud as will invalidate the bond. Sooy
v. State, 39 N. J. L. 135; Guardian F. Ins.
Co. v. Thompson, 68 Cal. 208; Dinsmore v.
Tidball, 34 Ohio 418; Franklin Bank v.
Cooper, 36 Me. 179.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
William Jones had been in the employ
of the plaintiffs for more than six years
prior to the giving of the bond, on which
the present action is founded. lIe had
misappropriated and embezzled moneys of
the firm duriag this period. Cobb & Co.
were aware of this fact and they continued
Jones in their service. They did not communicate their knowledge of his dishonesty to Curry, the defendant. This
was incumbent upon them as a legal duty.
The failure to do so invalidated the obligation.
In the case of Sooy vs. State, 39 N. J. L.
135, the Treasurer of the State of New
Jersey had been guilty of embezzlements,
which had been known to the controller,
and a new bond given without acquainting the sureties of. such default. The
Court in holding that the sureties were not
liable declared: "le had been guilty of
embezzlements which had been known to
the State, and that no disclosure of such
malpractices had been made to the sureties
and that he was ignorant of them, is such a
statement, as describes a fraud-at all
events, a fraud in law. A person called in
as the guarantor of the honesty of an employee has the right to infer that the continuance of such employee in the service
of the master is a tacit assertion on the
part of the latter that there has at least
been nothing criminal on the part of the
conduct of the servant in the course of his
employment. Such an inference is the
natural and reasonable, result of the circumstances and hence the obligee is
chargeable with the knowledge that the
surety is acting on that basis and with
such knowledge it is impossible to acquit
him of bad faith if he allows the suretyship to take effect."

"It is undoubtedly true that the directors had knowledge that Barton had
been dishonest and unfaithful in his office
as teller, which they concealed from the
sureties, and they were bound to apprize
the sureties of that fact, otherwise they
could not hold them." Bostwick vs. Van
Voorhis, 91 N. Y. 360.
"Nor are sureties under such circumstances liable either for past or future deficiencies." Franklin Bank vs. Cooper,
36 Me. 179.
In the cases relied upon by the plaintiff,
it was held that ignorance of the parties
would not relieve the sureties, nor where
the inducement to sign the obligation had
been offered by others than the obligee.
The plaintiff is not therefore entitled to
recover in this case, and judgment will be
entered in favor of the defendants.
BURKE vs. THE HARLAN AND
HOLLINGSWORTH CO.
Vice-rnaster--ellow-workman-Negligence of foreman resulting in
injury to workman.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Edward Charles Burke is a fitter-up by
trad2, and was employed by the Harlan
and Hollingsworth Company. On the
sixth day of November, 1899, Burke was
worling on a torpedo boat at the works of
the defendant in the City of Wilmington.
Burke, together with five or six other men,
was en gaged in boltingon very heavy pieces
of iron, weighing several hundred pounds.
These sheets of iron were raised up to
the frame work of the boat by means of
ropes and pulleys. In this work the company always used a peculiar clamp, which
was fastened to che frame-work of the
boat. A rope was attached to each of
these clamps and to the ends of the sheet
of iron-two ropes and two clamps being
used with each sheet. On this particular
day one of these clamps was missing, and
had been missing for some time, and in its
stead the boss informed the men to use a
strap or rope. One of the workmen
placed a strap on the frame-work of the
boat to take the place of the clamp. The
sheet of iron was being raised in this manner, Burke standing under one end of the
same, and another workman standing
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under the other end, ready to bolt the sheet
on the frame -when it was raised to its
proper place. When the sheet was raised
to a certain point the strap slipped, allowing the iron to fall several feet. Burke
happened to be under this end of the iron,
aud in order to save his life he jumped
several feet, and caught his left foot in the
rope and tackle, spraining his ankle so
badly that he has spentseveral weeks in the
hospital, and will not be able to work for
a long time. At the time of the hurt it
was nearly six o'clock in the evening, and
the company had only one very small
light down in the dock where the men
-were working-the other lights all having
been taken away or ordered to be taken
away by the boss or superintendent for
some other purpose. The place had usually been lighted with electricity, but no
such light was there at this time. It was
so dark that Burke could not see where he
was jumping. Burke brings an action for
damages against the defendant company.
The defendant asks for a non-suit.
TAYLOR (WALTER) and FENTON for the
plaintiff.
1. Defendant is liable; for, (a) Employers are liable for injuries from neglect to
furnish proper appliances or a suitable
place to work. Mullen v. Ship Co., 78 Pa.
25; Lewis v. Seifert, 116 Pa. 647; Ross v.
Walker, 139 Pa. 42; Schall v. Cole, 107
Pa. 1. (b) Where duty to furnish proper
appliances is delegated, the agent stands
in place of master. Snow v. R. R. Co., 8
Allen 447; Lewis v. Seifert, 1116 Pa. 647.
2. The case cannot beno-suited, for (a)
The question of reasonable safety of implements is for the jury. Mullen v. Ship
Co., 78 Pa. 25; R. R. v. Keenan, 103 Pa.
124; Rummel v. Dilworth, 111 Pa. 343.
M URR and LIGHT for the defendant.
1. The motion for a non-suit.should be
granted, for the "boss" was, under Ihe
rulings of the following cases, a fellowworkman, and the company cannot be
held liable for injury to an employe
through his negligence. Lewis v. Seifert,
116 Pa. 628; Keystone Bridge Co. v. Newberry, 96 Pa. 246; N. Y. L. E. & W. R. R.
Co. v. Bell, 112 Pa. 400; Lehigh Valley
Coal Co. v. Jones, 86 Pa. 432; Mullen v.
Steamship Co., 78 Pa. 25; Harrison v.
Collins, 86 Pa. 153; City of Erie v. Caulkins, 85 Pa. 247.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The general rule is thoroughly esutablished in this as in other states that an employer is not liable for an injury to one employe resulting from the negligence of an-

other employe.
Ryam v. Cumberland
Valley R. R. Co., 23 Pa. 384; Caldwell v.
Brown, 53 Pa. 453; Lehigh Valley Coal
Co. v. Jones, 86 Pa. 432; Allegheny Heating Co. v. Rohan, 118 Pa. 223; Lewis v.
Seifert, 116 Pa. 628; Duffy v. Oliver, 131
Pa. 203.
An employer, however, owes certain
well defined dutie to his employe, and a
delegation of his duties will not relieve
him from liability for the consequences of
non-performance or of breach. He must
use reasonable care; (1) in selecting his employes, (2) in selecting materials to be used
by them, (3) in selecting tools, machinery
or other appliances, (4) in selecting for
them a place in which to work, and (5)
when they are young and inexperienced,
in instructing them concerning the work
they are to perform. Lehigh Coal .Co. v.
Hayes, 128 Pa. 394; Payne v. Reese, 100
Pd. 301; Lehigh Coal Co. v. Jones, 86 Pa.
432; Shaffer v. Haich, 110 Pa. 575.
Now, in the case at bar it is contended
that the defendant was remiss in the performance of its duty to use due care in the
selection of tools and appliances; that the
strap used in place of the iron clamp at
the time of the accident was not a proper
and safe appliance, and that the company
was responsible for its use. Does the evidence sustain this contention? In the
first place, it is not made clear whether the
fall of the iron sheet was caused by the inherent inefficiency of the strap appliance
or by the negligence of a workman in
fastening it about the iron sheet. Assuming, however, that the strap was an unsafe appliance, was the company responsible for its-use? We think not. There is
no evidenceas to the nature of the "boss'"
duties, and in the absence of any information we must assume that the word is
used as asynonym of the word 11foremany"
The cases in which damages have been
sought for injuries resulting from the negligence of foremen are very numerous,
and in other jurisdictions there is considerable conflict of authority. Upon principle, much wohld seem to depend upon
the nature of the foreman's duties in each
particular case. But in this state the
courts have refused to look beyond the
term itself, and have uniformly held that
for the negligence of a foreman, an employer cannot be compelled to respond.
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New York, etc., R. R. v. Bell, 112 Pa. 400;
Ross v. Walker, 139 Pa. 42; Weger v. Pa.
R. R. Co., 55 Pa. 460; Duffey v. Oliver, 131
Pa. 203; Lehigh Coal Co. v. *Jones,86 Pa.
432; Keystone Bridge Co. v. Newberry, 96
Pa. 246; Gerwig v. Folwell, 13 W. N. C.
267.
Since in the case at bar, then, the person
who directed the use of the strap was not
a vice-master, that is to say, a representative of the company, but merely a fellowworkman of a higher grade, the company
is not liable for his negligdnce. If it appeared that an officer of the company ema*powered to provide necessary apparatus
had authorized the use of the strap, the
company would be compelled to respond in
damages, but in the absence of any evidence of such authority, the plaintiff's
case must fall.
It is true that the plaintiff's injury may
have been the result in part of the darkness of the dock upon which he was working. But since it appears that the darkness was due to the negligent act of the
same boss in orderingall ofthelamps to be
taken away the company is free from legal
responsibility.
Motion for non-suit granted.
SARAH MOFFIT vs. LOUIS THORPE.
Action in assumpsit.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

John Moffit dying, his land descended
to his two sons, subject to the dower of
his widow, Sarah. Partition was instituted, in the proceedings in which the
land was sold to Thorpe for $4,000, of
which a third was paid to each of the sons
and the court ordered the other third of it
to remain in the hands of the purchaser
during the natural life of Sarah Moffit,
and the interest thereon to be paid to her
on the 1st of April of every year. Thorpe
neglected to pay the interest for the years
1895, 1896, 1897, when, on August 13, 1897,
this assumpsit was brought. Thorpe objects, (1)that the action is not proper; (2)
no personal judgment,but only aj udgment
"de terris," can be entered against him;
(3) the land has, without fault of his,
yielded no income; (4) the plaintiffhad
agreed to give him time. The evidence on
the last point was, that, being in default,

Mrs. Moffit expostulated with him, and
insisted that she needed the income. He
represented his poverty, the destruction of
his crops on the land for two years by
drouth and hail, and she, in pity, agreed
that he need not bother himself until after
the next harvest, before the arrival of
which, however, this action was brought.
DEAL and HOLCOME for the plaintiff.
I. In regardto first exception, the counsel cited Act of 25th May, 1887, P. & L.
271. Second exception, Act of29th March,
1832, 41. 'Third exception, Edward v.
Hess, 4 Kulp 242; 3 Rawle 183.
CLIPPINGER and KERN for the defendant.
1. Assumpsit cannot lie when there is
no express promise or assumption. Nailor
v. Stanley; 10 S. & R. 450; Baker v. Leibert, 125 Pa. 113.
2. Judgment must be de terris, and not
personal, if judgment is returned. Pedcocke v. Bye, 3 Rawle 183; DeHarn v.
Bartholomew, 51 Pa. 126.
3. Land yielded no income, and widow
had given time, thus was barred till its
expiration.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

In the partition of John Moffit's land,
after his death, the land was sold to Louis
Thorpe for $4,000, of which the court ordered $1,333.33 to be retained by Thorpe,
and the interest thereon to be paid annually to-Sarah Moffit, the widow. The
acceptance of the land under the order
imposed on Thorpe a personal liability to
pay the interest, even without a bond or
recognizance. The action of assumpsit is
the remedy which is appropriate for the
enforcement of this liability. Kunselman
v. Stine, 192 Pa. 462.
It follows that the judgment recoverable
is not simply deterris,but personal. The
land is specifically liable-3 Liens 540,541,
and to enforce this specific liability a judgment de terriswould be proper. But, as
the acceptance of the land under the decree of the Orphans' Court involved an
assumption of personal liability, it is
evident that thejudgment against Thorpe
should authorize not only a sale of the
land, but a sale of any property whichis
answerable for his debts. The plaintiff is
entitled toapersonaljudgment, not to one
merely de terris. Kunselman v. Stine,
192 Pa. 462.
The fact that the land has yielded no
income is irrelevant. Even were the de-
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fendant liable only to ajudgment de terris,
he would not escape it by showing the insufficiency of the product of the land to
pay the claims. But a personal liability
for the price of land, or for the annual installments of interest on its retained price,
has never yet been considered extinguished or postponed because of the disappointment of the purchaser in respect to
the profits he hoped to realize from it.
The agreement to give time was not
binding,'because it was not supported by
any consideration, nor has any result followed which could convert it into an estoppel.
Judgment affirmed.

JOHN RODGERS vs. CHARLES
SEMPLE.
Contract-Consideration.
STATEMERNT OF THE CASE.

Semple, owning oilland, gave Rodgers an
option for three nonths to buy it for $10,000,
authorizing Rodgers meantime to adopt
such tests a- he chose, to determine the
presence of oil in it. Rodgers madeacontract with James Newton to sell to Newton one-half of the land at $6,000, if the
latter would reimburse him, Rodgers, his
expenses of prospecting. After Rodgers
had spent 5600, and after the contract with
Newton, Semple agreed to reimburse him
the expenses, if he should not wish to take
the land. Newton subsequently paid
Rodgers the 5600 expended by him. Newton and Rodgers then both agreed that the
purchase of the land would not be profitable, and Rodgers declined to exercise his
option to purchase from Semple. This
suit is by Rodgers to recover the $600, he
intending to pay it over toNewton whom,
since the abandonment of the purchase, be
has promised to repay if he should collect
from Semple.
KATZ

and

CLARK

for the plaintiff.

1. If money be expended or inconveni.ence sustained it is a valuable consideration. Earle v. Angell, 157 Mass. 294;
Richardson v. Gosser, 26 Pa. 335.
2. The surrendering by the vendee of
his rights under the option is such a consideration as renders contract binding.
McCullough v. Cowler, 5 V. & S. 427; 5
Pick. 384.
ALEXLANDER and HESS for the defendant.

1. The promise to pay expenses is without consideration, and, therefore, void.
Bronson v. Kitchuman, 148 Pa. 541.
2. Rodgers was not acting as agent for
undisclosed principal in this transaction,
but then if he was the principal should
sue.or theagentforthe useof theprincipal.
Gilpin v. Howell, .5 Pa. 41; McGunnough v. Thornton, 10 S. & R. 251.
3. He suffered no loss, consequently the
sum cannot be recovered. Watkins v.
More, 192 Pa. 221.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The decision of this case turns upon the
nature of the contract between Rodgers
and Newton. The counsel for plaintiff
argued with considerable ingenuity that
Newton agreed to reimburse Rodgers only
in case Rodgers should actually sell to him
one-half of the land; that his payment of
$600 was conditioned upon such sale, and
that since the sale was not subsequently
effected, Newton may at any time recover
from Rodgers the amount paid to him.
Although it is possible that such was the
intention of the parties, we think it a
more reasonable construction to regard the
promise of Newton as conditioned not
upon the sale of the land, but upon the opportunity of sharing in Rodgers' venture.
Rodgers had an option which seemed to
Newton to be a very attractive one, and in
order that he might share in the large
profits which might be derived from it in
case oil should be found, he agreed to pay
the expenses of the venture. In other
words, in the hope of large profits, Newton assumed the risk of loss. This construction of the contract is supported, not
only by the circumstances of the transaction, but by the additional circumstances
that Newton appears to have actually reimbursed Rodgers for the expenses at or
about the time when it was finally determined that the land should not be purchased from Semple. Had Newton's engagement been conditioned upon the sale
to him of one-half of the land covered by
the option, he would hardly have perf.,rmed before the happening of the condition, and certainly not at a time when it
had been practically determined that the
condition should not be performed.
The payment of S600 by Newton being
in performance of his contract, and, therefore, not recoverable by him, it follows
that there is no ground upon which to sus-
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tain this action. The defendant's agree- I the receipts are accurate and authentic.
ment to reimburse was with plaintiff Horan v. Weiler, 41 Pa. 470; Young v.
Edwards, 72 Pa. 267; Mead v. Conroe, 113
alone, and apparently was made without
Pa. 220.
knowledge of the agreement between
FRANTz and HEIST for defendant.
plaintiff and Newton. Pursuant to this
1. Thompson must have received the
latter contract, the expenses of prospectmoney or he would not have suffered the
ing were paid by Newton and not by plainreceipts to be endorsed on the back of the
bond. Chamberlayne's Best on Evidence,
tiff; the plaintiff has suffered no loss whatSee. 406; Railroad Co. v. Weber, 76 Pa. 157.
ever; and there is nothing for which to
2. That Thompson knew of Temple's sigreimburse him. Watkins v. Moore, 192
nature must be inferred by his own signaPa. 221.
ture attached to two subsequent receipts.
McKensie v. Heskitt, L. R. 7 Oh. Div.
From our point of view, the promise
675; Ins. Co. v. Railroad, 72 N. Y. 90.
of plaintiff to repay Newton, made after
CHARGE OF COURT.
the abandonment of the purchase, is
Gentlemen of the Jury:
clearly without consideration, although to
The bond of Temple became payable
permit plaintiff to recover in this action
Feb. 11th, 1873. This assumpsit was
andthen denya recovery to Newton in case
brought upon iton Nov. 13th, 1894. There
plaintiff should refuse to pay him, would
is a well-known presumption of law that
be not only to save plaintiff from loss but
any debt, whether manifested by a speactually to permit him to gain by his connection with the unprofitable option ob- cialty or not, whether of record or not, will
be presumed paid after twenty years have
tained by him.
elapsed since the time when, by the terms
Judgment for defendant.
of the contract, it became payable. Recognizances, mortgages, judgments are subEXECUTORS OF JAMES THOMPSON
ject to this presumption. A fortiori are
vs ADMINISTRATOR OF
bonds and other debts not forming, in any
WM. TEMPLE.
sense, a public record. Trickett Limitations, 429 et seg.
Presumption of payment of a specialty.
This presumption, however, is of the
rebuttable class. Its effect is chiefly to
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
transfer from the defendant the duty of
On Aug. 11th, 1870, Temple made a bond
proving payment, and to impose on the
for $10,000, payable with interest in 18
plaintiff, what in other cases does not
months to Thompson. Temple died on
exist, viz., the duty of proving non-payJuly 17th, 1889, and Thompson on Sept. ment. The plaintiff may prove non-pay14th, 1894. Endorsed on bond were 4 re- ment in the ordinary case by his own
ceipts for payment of interest, in the hand- testimony. He may rely on the testimony
writing of Thompson, dated respectively
of any one else who is able to satisfy the
Feb. l1th, 1872, for $900; Feb. 11th, 1874, jury that lie hac knowledge of the nonfor $1,8'00; Feb. 14th, 1875, for $400; July
payment. A familiar mode of proving
13th, 1875, for 400. The 1st and 2d of the non-payment is that of showing that,
these receipts were signed by Temple.
within the 20 years preceding the suit, the
The other two were both in the hand of defendant has admitted that the debt is
Thompson and signed by him. On Nov.
still unpaid. The admission may be by
13th, 1894, assumpsit on the bond.
word, oral or written. It may also be by
HARPEL and SHIPMAN for plaintiff.
act. The payment of interest on the debt
1. The presumption of payment after a
or of any part of the principal on account,
lapse of twenty years is rebutted by showwould be an act eloquent of the consciousing partial payment made before the exness that the debt remained unpaid.
piration of the twenty years.
Limitations 478.
2. Kitchen v. Deardoft, 2 Pa. 481; Shaffer
v. Shaffer, 41 Pa. 51; Stout v. Levan, 3 Pa.
Paym .nts alleged to have been made by
2,36; Cremer's estate, 5 W. & S. 331; Run- Temple are relied upon by the plaintiff*
ner's appeal, 121 Pa. 649; Lash v. Von
Two of these payments are proven by enNeida, 109 Pa. 207; Addams v. Leibzinger,
dorsements on the bond. These endorse1 W. & S. 243.
3. The presumption of law is that
ments, though written by Thompson, are
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signed by Temple. He thus admitted
their accuracy, and the payment thus
proven is satisfactory evidence that the
debt, at the time of such payment, was
still unpaid. But the first of these paymnents was made on Feb. l1th, 1872, and
the second on Feb. lth, 1874. Thisaction
w-as brought Nov. 13th, 1894, more than
20 years after the later-of them. The presumption of payment has run during that
time, unless something since happening
has prevented it.
There is a receipt on the bond of the
date of Feb. 14th, 1875, for $400. and
another of the date of July 13th, 1875, for
$400. If Temple made these payments at
these times, he thereby acknowledged the
continued existence of the debts, and as
less than 20 years had elapsed when the
action was brought, since making the acknowledgement, the presumption of payment would be repelled. But did Temple
make these payments? The last two enlorsements are wholly in the handwriting
of Thompson and signed by him. Do they
tell the truth? Had Temple signed them
they might have been regarded as true.
But it is an almost inviolable principle
that the declarations of one man cannot
affect another who is in no privity with
hiin. Thompson's declaration that Temple
paid him at certain dates, his executor is
now attempting to use for his own advantage. This, ordinarily, cannot be done.
But it is also a principle that a declaration made against the pecuniary interest
of the declarant, who is now dead, may be
used if it subsequently becomes of advantage to his executor oi administrator to use
it. It must, however, when made, have
been against his interest and that it was
thus against his interest must be made to
appear. The admission by Thompson that
a part of a debt owing to him has been
paid would, ordinarily, be against his interest. But whether the admission was
in fact against his interest depends on the
time when he made it. If he made it
after 20 years had elapsed it would, if believed, be a means of enabling him to recover the bond. While he would have
sacrificed $800, lie would have secured for
himself a vastly larger sum. When then
was the admission made? Before or after
the expiration of 20 years since the last established payment? It might have been

ante-dated, and the date inserted in the
endorsementcannot be accepted as correct
without evidence. It is possible then that
the two sums of $400 each were in fact not
paid by Temple to Thompson. The burden of showing that they were paid rests
upon Thompson. Lash v. Von Neida,
109 Pa. 207; Hart v. Bucher, 182 Pa. 604;
186 Pa. 384; Runner's Appeal, 121 Pa. 649;
Cremer's Estate, 5 W. & S. 331; Trickett
Limitations, 479. Did the case rest on
the facts proven before the jury, there
could be no recovery.
But counsel for the defendant has insisted that the third and fourth endorsements should be accepted as true and that
tile credits should be allowed the defendant. This act of his furnishes the information which was otherwise wanting.
We have now not only the assertion of
Thompson that he received the two payments, but khe assertion of the counsel for
the administrator of Temple that he received them, and that he received them at
the time mentioned in the endorsements.
Statements of counsel thus made are fo be
accepted as true, in so far as they affect
the client. As, therefore, Temple paid
$400 on Feb. 14th, 1875, and $400 on July
13th, 1875, less than, 20 years before the
bringing of the action, there is no defence.
The plaintiff is entitled to recover $10,000
plus interest to this day less the four payments proven or admitted to have been
made, plus interest to this day from the
times they were respectively made.
JOHN BASCOM vs. HORACE POTTS.
Negligence--Liabilityof one in possession
of land as vendee under articles.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Potts, owning a house with a side lot,
enclosed by a brick wall, which stood on
the building line of the street, by article
dated April 13, 1898, agreed to convey it
to Bolmer Hart for $4,900. Hartpaid $750
in cash, and was allowed on April 14th to
take possession. He had the privilege of
paying the balance at any time, but boun d
himself to pay it on Nov. 30, 1898. The
wall wasinsecure, and on April 16th, while
Bascom was walking on the pavement in
front of it, it fell streetward, crushing him
and breaking his legs. Thewallhad been
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visibly insecure for at least three months,
and Potts had been on four occasions
warned by persons in the neighborhdod
that it was dangerous. Bascom was a
stranger in the neighborhood, but had
passed along the wall once three weeks
before, and had then observed that its
foundation was dilapidated.
He had,
however, forgotten it until the accident.
The injuries, if Potts is liable for them,
should be compensated in $5,000 damages.
RALSTON and BOWERS for the plaintiff.
1. The estate of Hart is d tenancy at will.
Tiedeman on Real Property, 216; Gould

v. Thompson, 4 Mete. 224; Harris v. Frink,
49 N. Y. 32. Legal title was in Potts,

against whom the action will lie. Jones
v. Patterson, 12 Pa. 149; Brookville Borough v. Arthurs, 152 Pa. 334; Fow v. Roberts, 108 Pa. 491; Winder v. McCan, 134
Pa. 334. Previous knowledge will not
charge the plaintiff with contributory
iegligence. City of Altoona v. Lotz, 114
Pa. 23;8; Humphries v. Armstrong County,
56 Pa. 204; Pass. R R. v. Bandrow, 92 Pa.
475; Winans v. Rudolph, 169 Pa. 606;
Beatty v. Gilmore, 16 Pa. 463.
VALENTINE and KLINE for the defendant.
1. The action should have been brought
against Hart. The equitable title was in
him. 2 Addison on Contracts 12; Seton
v. Slade, 7 Ves. 265 ; Siter's Appeal, 26 Pa.
178; Kerr v. Day, 14 Pa. 112; Reed v. Lukens, 44 Pa. 200; Robb v. Mann, 11 Pa.
300; Railroad v. Spenser, 156 Pa. 85;
Frick's Appeal, 101 Pa. 485. Hart alone is
responsible, being in possession. Grier v.
Sampson, 27 Pa. 183; Blunt v. Aiken, 13
Wend. 522; Cheetham v. Hampson, 4 T.
R. 318; Palmore v. Morris, 182 Pa. 82. The
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. Lynch v. Erie, 151 Pa. 380; Haven
v. Bridge Co., 151 Pa. 620; Brendlinger v.
New Haven, 148 Pa. 93; Railway v. Taylor, 104 Pa. 306; City v. Magill, 101 Pa.
616; Monongahela v. Fischer, 111 Pa. 9.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The law imposes upon the owner of real
estate lying along a street or highway the
obligation of keeping his premises in such
a state of order and repair that passers-by
will not be injured as a result of his failure
to do so; for any injury consequent upon
his negligence in this respect he must respond in damages to the injured party.
Grier v. Sampson, 27 Pa. 113. A pedestrian has a right to assume that thig duty
will be performed by the owner of abutting
property, and is not bound to look about
for dangers from such a source, further

than that he must take those precautions,
and exercise that degree of care and vigilance, which the ordinarily reasonable and
prudent man would display under like
circumstances. It is not incumbent upon
him to devote his faculties exclusively to
the detection and avoidance of dangers,
such as form the basis of the present action; it is enough if he exercises ordinary
care. Buch v. Phila., 181 Pa. 591. Indeed,
so zealously do the courts guard the rights
of the people to travel in safety over public thoroughfares, that if the property
owner fails in the exercise of his duty, the
municipality'willbe held liable. Chilton
v. Carbondale, 160 Pa. 463; Smith v.
Miauch Chunk, 3 Sup. 495; Hock v. Borough, 4 Forum 46; though in the latter
case the municipal corporation would have
a right of contribution from the property
owner. Brookville v. Arthurs, 152 Pa.
334.
It has been argued, however, that there
can be no recovery inasmuch as the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.
Leaving the question of defendant's failure
to exercise that degree of care which he
was bound to do, in order that public
safety might not be impelfled, it becomes
pertinent to examine this phase of the
question. Knowledge of the defective condition of the premises was brought to the
plaintiff three weeks before; was he justified, in view of all the surrounding circumstances, in presuming, after such lapse
of time, that it had been repaired ? Certainly it is not for us to say that he was,
not. It has been urged further by counsel, citing Lynch v. Erie, 151 Pa. 380; Haven v. Bridge Co., Id. 620; Brendlinger v.
New Haven, 148 Pa. 93, that by passing on
the opposite side the danger could have
been avoided. Could it? Was there a
pavement on the opposite side? The
street-might have been a water-front, with
only one pavement. And if there was
another, was it passable? Was travel congested, rendering it unsafe to cross? Or,
it was said, he might have taken another
route. Nothing appears in the statement
showing any other way by which he could
reach his destination as safely and as expeditiously as by passing along the street
on which the wall was built. Nor wa8 it
negligence per se for him to use this street,
when he might have used another. Chil-
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ton v. Carbondale, 160 Pa. 463. If, from
the plaintiff's knowledge of all the circumstances, it was not reasonable for him
to presume, after three weeks' notice, that
the wall had been repaired; or, if he failed
to recall its unsafe condition when he
should have done so; or, if there was
another route,equally safe and convenient,
which he could have used, then he was
guilty of contributory negligence, and
cannot recover. To determine these facts
is the duty of the jury, and the burden of
proof to establish them is on the defendant. Chilton v. Carbondale, supra; vide
Humphreys v. Armstrong Co., 56 Pa. 204;
Altoona v. Lotz, 114 Pa. 238; Shaw v.
Phila., 159 Pa. 487.
We have treated the case thus far on the
assumption that Potts, having the legal
title to the premises, is to be regarded as
the real owner of the property, so as to
charge him with liability. This we regard
as the pivotal point in the case, upon
which turns the question of sending it to
the jury, under proper instructions. The
defendant, Potts, had, two days before the
injury was sustained by Bascom, transferred the possession of the premises to one
Bolmer Hart, pursuant to articles of agreement, wherein it was stated that, upon
payment of a certain sum in cash and the
balance on a future day named, Hart was
to become the owner of the premises.
While it is true that in some jurisdictions
Potts and Hart would sustain to each
other the relation of landlord and tenant,
such an arrangement being considered a
tenancy at will-Gould v. Thompson, 4
letc. 22-1;
Harris v. Frink, 49 N. Y. 32;
yet in Pennsylvania we think it must be
regarded as settled that Hart, from the
date he took possession, must by the terms
of the contract be treated, to all intents
and purposes, as the owner of the entire
estate. Siter's Appeal, 26 Pa. 180; Kerr v.
Day, 26 Pa. 114; Reed v. Lukens, 44 Pa.
200; Richter v. Selin, 8 S. & R. 460; Williams R. P. 164. "The interest of the
purchaser is not circumscribed by the extent of the purchase money paid, but embraces the entire value of the land over
and above the purchase money due. He
is treated as the owner of the whole estate,
encumbered only by the purchase money.
If the land increases in value, it is his
gain; if it decreases, if improvements are

destroyed by fire or otherwise, it is his
loss." Siter's Appeal, supra. That this
doctrine is settled law is apparent from a
perusal of the decisions. Thus, ithas been
held that the proceeds of a sale of real
estate, sold to satisfy judgments recovered
against a vendor before the execution of
such a contract, were properly paid to the
vendee, as against n later lien creditor of
the vendor, even though the vendee had
made no payment on account of the purchase money. Frick's Appeal, 101 Pa.
485; Siter's Appeal, supra. The vendee's
interest may be bound by the lien of a
judgment, and when perfected by payinent and conveyance, gives the lien the
Wcurity of the entire estate from the date
of possession. Morrison v. Wentz, 7 W.
437. The vendee may claim insurance on
property destroyed between the time of
taking possession and delivery of the deed.
Reed v. Lukens, supra; and this, too,
where he holds under a lease with an option to purchase. Railvay Co. v. Spencer,
156 Pa. 485. He can maintain trespass for
cutting down trees on the premises-Mliller v. Zufall, 113 Pa. 317; and is not guilty
of misrepresentation to an insurance company by alleging that he has the "entire,
unconditional and sole ownership" in the
property. Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 117 Pa.
460.
Under such a contract the vendor is regarded as having nothing more than a lien
on the property for the unpaid purchase
money-Zerby v. Zerby, 9 W. 234; Zeigler's Appeal, 69 Pa. 47, which he may use
to compel payment thereof. Washabaugh
v. Carver, 81 Pa. 497. "In this respect,"
says Sharswood, J., "it is exactly the case
of a mortgage, which vests the legal title
in the mortgagee. * * Had the property
been swallowed up by an earthquake, the
entire loss would have fallen on the vendee." Millville Ins. Co. v. Wilgus, 88 Pa.
107. A vendee in possession may mortgage the property or put an easement upon
it; he must pay the taxes from the time
he goes into possession. Am. & Eng.
Encyc., Vol. 28, p. 122, et seg. Inasmuch,
then, as the vendee is treated as the owner
of the premises, both as to his vendor and
to third persons, entitled to all the gains
and subject to all the losses after it comes
into his possession, it follows that, for an
injury to another, resulting from a failure
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to keep the property in repair, he, and not
his vendor, should bear the loss. The fact
that he had been in possession but two
days when the accident occurred cannot
be used as a shield to protect him. He is
presumed to have made an examination of
the property; the wall was visibly defective for three months; he must, therefore, have been familiar with its condition
before he bought it. Palmore v. Morris,
182 Pa. 82 While it is true that in that
case the title had actually passed by delivery of the deed, yet the defendant's
vendee in the case at bar being regarded
"to all intents and purposes as the owner
of the property," we consider it authoritative on the point before us, and hold that
the action has been improperly brought.
Judgment for the defendant.
GEo. W. AUBREY, P. J.
NOIRMAN JOSEPHS vs. HARRY
JACOBS, WITH NOTICE TO JOHN
JACOBS, TERRE-TENANT.
Aforlgage-kfechanics' lien-JudgmetPrioritlyof liens.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

John Ames, on the first of February,
1898, in writing agreed to convey a lot of
land in Mechanicsburg to Harry Jacobs,
who, at once paying $1,000 of the price,
four weeks afterwards made a contract
with Samuel Bolles to erect a house on it.
Bolles began operations at once, excavated
a cellar, erected the walls thereof, and of
the building, and put it under roof. The
contract stipulated that Bolles should deliver the building free from mechanics'
liens. Cooper furnished $1,200 worth of
bricks, and not being paid by Bolles filed
a lien for the price. When the house had
reached this stage, and after the Cooper
lien had been filed, Ames, May 11, 1898,
made the conveyance to Jacobs and, at the
time the deed was delivered, received from
Norman Josephs, who, at Jacobs' instance,
advanced it, the residue of the purchase
money-$5,000-and Jacobs simultaneously delivered a mortgage in the usual
form to Josephs for $5,000. This mortgage
was not recorded until July 10, 1898. A
judgment was afterwards recovered for
$200 against Harry Jacobs, on which the
lot was sold to John Jacobs for $1,500, a

doubt existing among the bidders whether

the mortgage would remain on the
premises or not.
This is scirefaciason the mortgage.
BOLTE and LENTZ for the plaintiff.
This was a purchase money mortgage in
reality. Com. T. Ins. & T. Co. v. Ellis,
192 Pa. 321; Campbell and Pharos' Appeal, 36 Pa. 247; Cohen's Appeal, 10W. 1N.
C. 544. Thevendor's rights in a contract
to sell are superior and prior to a mechanics' lien against the equitable estate. Lyon
v. McGuft'y, 4 Barr. 129; Lovev. Jones, 4
Watts 465; Watts v. Steel, 1 Barr, 3865;
Gault v. Demming, 3 Phila. 337.
KENNEDY and SHELLENDERGER for the

defendant.
The lien attaches to the title of the one
having the work done. Trickett on Lkns,
vol. 3, pg. 31; Weaver v. Sheeler, 118 Pa.
634; Act of April 28, 1840, 2 P. & L. DMg.
2,928. see. 12. But a lien on an equitable
estate attaches to a subsequently arcquired
legal estate. Lyons v. MeGuffty, 4 Pa.
126. Act of 1840, supra. Since the mechanics' lien attaches to the legal estate,
the mortgage is ascecond lien and is divested
by the sale on the judgment. Act of
April 19, 1893, 1 P. & L. Dig. 1,585, see.

125.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The contract for the erection of the
house, made by Harry Jacobs, made it
possible for mechanics' liens to arise, and
Cooper as a materialman in fact obtained
such a lien. This lien, however, attaehed"
only to the equitable estate of Jacobs, and
not to the legal title of John Ames. 3
Liens 31. When Ames subsequently conveyed the legal title to Jacobs, the lien
would have attached to it, 3 Liens 32, had
it not been for the execution, simultaneously, of the mortgage to Josephs.
Josephs advanced the purchase money
at the instance of Jacobs, and received directly from the latter the mortgage. This
mortgage must be deemed a purchase
money mortgage, and Josephs holds a relation to the equitable title of Jacobs,
somewhat similar to that of Ames. As
Ames had by virtue of his retention of le
legal title, a lien superior to the interests of
Jacobs and to the liens attaching to that
interest, Josephs now has a similar lien by
virtue of his mortgage.
There were two estates in the land, that
of the vendor, and that of the vendee.
The vendor's was of such a nature that; in
order to secure thepayment of the unpaid
purchase money, that of the vendee might
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have been extinguished. The mechanics'
lien attached to this precarious and subordinate interest. Though earlier in time,
it was inferior in efficacy. When the sale
on the judgment took place, the liens, 4i
order of efficacy were (1) the mortgage,
(2) the mechanics' lien, (3) 'he judgment.
The mortgage was, therefore, not divested,
but the purchaser at the execution sale
purchased the land charged with it. It
follows that the sci. fa. is properly
brought.
Judgment for plaintiff.

JOSEPH JOHNSON vs. SAMUEL
HOOLEY.
-Divestitureof lien.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Johnson had repaired a carriage for
Hopeton, and was detaining it because his
charges of $40 were not paid. Hopeton,
without Johnson's knowledge, took the
carriage from the shop, and sold it to
Hooley fort100. When Hooley learned, as
he did for the first time two days later, the
circumstances, he promised Johnson orally to pay him the $40, but subsequently
refused to keep his promise. Wherefore
this assumpsit is brought.
EDWARDS

and

MINNICH

for the plain-

tiff.
1. Johnson had right to retain possession of carriage under lien for price of repairs. ,Hume v. Noble, 95 Pa. 345; Mathins v. Sellers, 86 Pa. 486.
2: The lien is valid as against the vendee. Trickett on Liens, vol. 2, p. 732;
Swift v. Morrison, 2 W. N. C. 699.
3. If possession recovered wrongfully
the lien will still exist. Palmtoy v. Doutrick, 59 Cal, 154; Walcott v. Keith, 2
Foster 196.
RALSTON and NIcHOLLS for the defendant.
1. Bonafide purchaser without notice oflien secures good title. Webb v. Sharp.
80 U. S. 16; McFarlan v. Wheeler, 20
Wend. 467.
2. This is a parol contract without consideration, and, therefore, void. Cobb v.
Page, 17 Pa. 467. Bronson v. Kitchuman,
148Pa. 541.
3. The promise was for debt of another,
and, therefore, not within the statute of
frauds. Maul v. Bucknell, 50 Pa. 39; Hess's
Estate, 150 Pa. 346; Shoemaker v. King,
40 Pa. 107.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

It is well settled that one who performs
work upon a chattel for another, has a lien
thereon for his services. Yearsleyv. Gray,
140 Pa. 238; Haverly v. R. R. Co., 125 Pa.
116; Hensel v. Noble, 95 Pa. 345: MN~athias
v. Sellers, 86 Pa. 486; Burge v. Couverer, 5
Pa. C. C. 5. And the holder of such a lien
may maintain an action against an execution creditor of the bailor who has taken
it out of his possession. Yearsley v. Gray,
supra.
Hopeton, the owner of the carriage, had,
however, I'withoutJohnson's knowledge,"
taken it from the latter's shop and sold it
to the defendant, who was, evidently, igiorant of the facts giving Johnson a lien
upon it for his services. Does the lien attach to the carriage in the hands of
Hlooley? We think it does. "Thelienis
lost by voluntary surrender, but if the
property is taken from the bailee surreptitiously or violently, the lien is not lost."
Trickett on Liens, vol. 3, p. 556.
It is valid against not only the owner
but the owner's vendee, who has no actual
notice of the lien, the bailee not having
Swift v.
parted with the possession.
Morrison, 2 W. N. C. 699; Palmtoy v.
Doutrick, 59 Cal. 154; Walcott v. Keich, 22
N. H. 169; Busley v. Rose, 57 Iowa 651.
Johnson then having avalid lien on the
carriage in the hands of Hooley, it remains
to consider whether Hooley was bound by
his oral promise to pay Johnson the
amount of the lien. The defendant insists -that the debt, having been contracted
by Hopeton, was an obligation of the
latter, which Hooley could not be compelled to pay, unless his promise to do so
had been in writing, as required by the
statute of frauds. But we are unable to
see how that statute has any application
to the case at bar. The carriage belonged
to Hooley, subject to the lien of Johnson.
It was, therefore, in effect, a debt of
Hooley's which he was bound to pay if he
desired to own the carriage unencumbered
by the lien. Having made a promise to
do so, which he refused to keep when performance of it was demanded by the
promisee, he clearly subjected himself to
action on his assumpsit. "Whenever the
main purpose and object of thepromisoris
not to answer for another, but to subserve
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some purpose of his own, his promise is
not within the statute, although it may be
in form a promise to pay the debt of another, and although the performance of it
may incidentally have the effect of extinguishing the liability of another."
Arnold v. Stedman, 45 Pa. 186; Stephenson
v. Hunt, 2 Allen 423.
Judgment for the plaintiff.
FENTON,J.
The contention of the defendant in this
case is, that his oral promise to pay the S40
due Johnson for repairs, was the promise
to pay the debt of another, and was, therefore, within the Statute of Frauds passed
April 26, 18.55, P. & L. 308.
The general rule is that the promise to
pay the debt of anothermustbein writing
and signed by the person sought to be
bound. But this rule is not without its
exceptions, and one of them is put quite
tersely in the case of Arnold v. Stedman,
45 Pa St. 186, "Where the leading object
of the promissor is to subserve an interest
or purpose of his own, notwithstanding
the effect is to pay or discharge the debt
of another, his promise is not within the
statute." Or, as was expressed by another
learned court, "Where the leading object of the promissor is to forego some lien,
interest, or advantage, and thereby confer
on the promissor a privilege or benefit
which he could not otherwise possess or
enjoy, an agreement made under such circumstances, and upon such consideration,
is a new, original and binding contract, although the effect of it may be to assume
the debt and discharge'the liability of another." Was the promise in this case
made "to induce a promisee to forego some
lien?"
The unauthorized taking of the carriage
from the possession of Johnson by Hopeton can have no effects on the plaintiff's
rights. Johnson had alien on the carriage
for the work performed and his voluntary
act alone could waive that lien. Hecould
enforce it by retaining the carriage until
his charges were paid, or he could sell
under the Act of December 14, 1863. The
result of the agreement between Hooley
andJohnson was that the plaintiff gave up
possession of the carriage and thus lost his
lien. He could have reclaimed the carriage
from Hooley by replevin; but, obviously

relying on the promise of Hooley, he refrained from such an action. Whatever
rights Hopeton had, Hooley succeeded to
by purchase. Had Johnson yielded possession to Hopeton, the lien would have
been discharged, and there is no reason
why this would not be true were one to
acquire Hopeton's rights. Pierce v.
Sweet, 33 Pa. St. 151; Rodgers v. Grothe,
58 Pa. St. 414; Davis v. Bigler, 62 Pa. St.
242.
This, then, is plainly, "Where theleading object of the promissor is to induce a
promisee to forego some lien, interest or
advantage, and thereby confer on the
promissor a privilege or benefit which he
could not otherwise possess or enjoy."
Hooley would have had to pay the $40 or
give up the carriage, His "leadingobject" was the subservience of his own inter
est, and, notwithstanding the effect was to
pay the debt of another, his promise is
binding. Taylor v. Preston, 79 Pa. St.
436; Merriman v. McManus, 102 Pa. St.
102; Jefferson Co. v. Slagle, 66 Pa. St. 202;
Landis v. Royer, 59 Pa. St. 95; Arnold v.
Stedman, supra.
In the latter case, Arnold sold Barrett a
lot on payments, with the agreement that
if the payments were not made when due,
the property reverted to Arnold. Barrett
took possession, and had a barn built..
against which Stedman, the builder, filed
a ihecianics' lien. Barrett failed to meet
his payments, and Arnold brought ejectinent. While the suit was pending,
Arnold orally promised Stedman to satisfy
the lien upon the favorable termination of
the proceedings in ejectment. Thispromise was held to be given because of
Arnold's interest, and was binding upon
him. The interest of the promissor in
both these cases is to enjoy undisturbed
possession ; in one it is of realty, in the
other, of personalty. In Arnold v. Stedman, the holder of the lien agreed not to
assert a right for a time; in the present
case, the holder of a lien agrees to waive
the lien.
In the light of this and the foregoing
cases, the defendant is liable on his promise, andjudgment is accordingly entered
for the plaintiff.

SEBRRMG, J.
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WM. OREN vs. ABRAM EWING.
Replevn-ight to recover a dead human
body-Lien on same.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Jesse Oren died on Jan. 1, 1900, in the
Carlisle Hospital. The authorities delivered the body to Ewing. Wim. Oren, the
brother, demanded the body from the defendant, who declined to deliver it unless
paid $50 for the services which he had up to
that timeperformed upon it. Wim. Oren
therefore brings this action of replevin.
DEAL and JOHNSTON for the plaintiff.
1. The right to bury a corpse and protect
legal right
is a
it
and preserve
which the courts will recognize and protect, and said right belongs exclusively to
the next of kin. 42 Pa. 301; 4 Bradford, N.
Y. 503-32.
2. A person has no right to retain a body
for a debt due for labor on said body. 5

A. & E. Euc. 118.
HENDERSON and KENNEDY for the de-

fendant.
1. Thereis no property in a corpse Fox
v. Gordon, 16 Phila. 185; 2 Blackstone
Corn., 429; Magher v. Driscol, 99 Mass. 28.
2. In Pennsylvania replevin is a question of property, and there being no
1)ropetty in a corpse the plaintiff cannot
recover possession by this action. Wyncoop v. Wyncoop, 42 Pa.; Lester v. McDowell, 18 Pa. 91; Harlan v. Harlan, 15
Pa. 507; Stoughton v. Rappalo, 3 S. & R.
562.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The primary purpose of replevin is to
recover the property in specie, not its
value. Whether the primary purpose
shall be realized or defeated depends upon
the will of the defendant; he may, in replevin, relinquish whatever property he
claims in the chattel by suffering the
sheriff to deliver the property to the
plaintiff and relying upon the plaintiffs
bond for reimbursement; but the defendant may elect his right to retain the property by givinga property bond. The etect
of a verdict for damages in favor of the
plaintiff; in the latter case, is to transfer
the title to the defendant. Herdic v.
Young, 55 Pa. 176. And a clause in the
property bond to return the goods to the
plaintiff is void. Moore v. Shenk, 3 Barr
13. If replevin is a remedy to recover
possession of a dead human body, it is not

an adequate remedy, and could not with
any certainty restore the body to the
Pierce v. Proprietors
proper custody.
of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R. I. at page
242.
Replevin cannot be maintained without
showing either a general or a special property in the plaintiff, together with the
right of immedihte possession. Lester v.
McDowell, 18 Pa. 91; Lake Shore Railway
Co. v. Ellsey, 85 Pa. 283. Says Thayer
P. J.: "Questions which relate to the
custody and disposal of the remains of the
dead do not depend upon the principles
which regulate the possession and ownership of property. a * * * There can be
no property in a corpse." Fox v. Gordon,
16 Phila. 185; Haynes' Case, 2 East P. C.
652; Foster v. Dodd, 8 Best & Smith 842;
If
Blackstone's Com., bk. 4, p. 235.
these premises are a correct statement of
the law the conclusion is inevitable. Replevin cannot be maintained for a dead
human body. 3 Lawson's Rights, Remnedies and Practice, at page 2432, Sec. 1343.
At common law the only crime against
property of any importance was larceny
and this concerned not the title but the
possession of personal property. Larceny
cannot be committed of things which are
not the subject of property, as of a corpse.
Haynes' Case, 2 East P. C. 652; Blackstone's Com., bk. 4, p. 235. But larceny
can be committed of a coffin in which the
body is interred; State v. Doepke, 68 Mo.
208; or of the clothes found upon a body
not buried. Wonson v. Sayward, 13 Pick.
402. In R. v. Edwards, 13 Cox C. C. 384
(1877) three pigs belonging to Sir William
Hart-Dyke were bitten by a mad dog,
thereupon shot and buried three feet deep
upon his estate. The prisoner went the
same evening, dug up the carcasses and
sent them to the London meat market.
It was held that notwithstanding that the
owner had no intention of making any
further use of the pigs, there was no abandonment of the property and that the
prisoner could be convicted of larceny.
would seem clear
From these decisions
that the courts have proceeded not upon
any theory of abandonment, but upon the
theory that there can be no property in a
dead human body, either before or after
burial. If there cannot be larceny of a
dead human body because there is no
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property in a corpse (and the courts have
so decided) it is difficult to understand
how the action of replevin will lie to recover possession of the -body or damages.
Moreover the prcecipe for a writ of replevin must state the value of the property. The plaintiff must give the sheriff
a bond in double the full value of the
goods as a pre-requisite to the issuance of
the writ from the sheriffs office. What
proof could be introduced to show the
value of a dead human body?
A few cases will illustrate the practice,
and while not conclusive they are at least
highly significant. The remains of
Stephen Girard were disinterred and
placed in the custody of an undertaker by
the city authorities. The relatives came
into a court of equity and asked for an injunction. In re Stephen Girard, 5 Pa. L.
J. Rep. 68.
In Scott v. Riley, 16 Phila. 106, the
plaintiff invoked a court of equity to give
himi the custody of the dead body of his
daughter for the purpose of burial. In R.
v. Fox, 2 Q. B. 247, where a jailer refused
to deliver up a corpse, the courtof Queen's
Bench issued a mandamus peremptory in
the first instance commanding that the
body should be delivered up to the executors. Says Gray, C. J. in Weld v. Walker,
130 Mass. 422: "Neither the husband nor
the next of kin have, strictly speaking,
any right of property in a dead body; but
controversies between them as to place of
its burial are in this country where there
are no ecclesiastical courts within the jurisdiction of a court of equity." Says
Potter, J.: "Although as we have said
the body is not property in the usually
recognized sense of the word, yet we may
consider it as a sort of cuasi-pro1perty,to
which certain persons may have rights,,as
they have duties to perform towards it
arising out of our common humanity.
But the person having charge of it cannot
be considered as the owner of it in any
sense whatever. He holds it only as a
sacred trust for the benefit of all who may
from family or friendship have an interest
in it, and we think that a court of equity
may well regulate it as sucl, and change
the custody if improperly managed."1
Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R. I. Rep. 227, at p. 242.

The motion for a compulsory non-suit is,
therefore, granted.
WARREN L. SHIPMAN, P. J.
By the Court:
The plaintiff brings this action to obtain
the body of his deceased brother in order
that he may properly bury it. The defendant, who has possession of the corpse,
and who has a claim for services rendered
in preparing it for burial, refuses to give it
up until he is paid. If the defendant has
any legal right to hold the body until his
charges are paid, the plainti if cannot re
cover. Nor can he recover unless this
action is that which the law has provided
for the adjustment of differences of this
character.
In Pennsylvania the action of replevin
lies in all cases in which one man claims
goods which are in the possession of
another without regard to the manner in
which the possession was obtained.
Bowery. Tallman, 5 W. &S.556; Harlan v.
Harlan, 15 Pa. 513. And the plhintiff need
only show a qualified property in the goods
claimed, provided he has the right of possession. Weaver v. Lawrence, 1 Dal. 157;
Shearick v. Huber, 6 Bin. 3; Woods v.
Nixon,Addison 134; Stoughton v.Rappalo,
3 Ser. & R. 562. If the plaintiff then has
a right of property in the remains of his
deceased brother he would have the right
to recover unless the defendant has the
right in the nature of a lien to detain the
corpse until his charges are paid.
The question then to be determined is,
has the plaintiff as next of kin of the deceased any right of property? It has
many times been decided that no one has
the right of property in the remains of a
deceased person. 3 Co. Inst. 203; 2 B1.
Com: 429; 11 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 81 Cooney
v. Lawrence; Foxv. Gordon, 16 Phila. 185;
Rex v. Fox, 22 B..°246; (42E. C. L. R. 659).
But it is also held that in the absence of
testamentary directions as to burial the
next of kin of a deceased has the legal
right to see to the preservation of a corpse
and Jiury it, and the courts will recognize
and protect this right. Fox v. Gordon, 16
Phila. 185; Pierce v. Swan Point Cemetery,
10 R. 1. 227; 5 Am. & Eng. Ency. L. 115
Does the right then to preserve and bury
the dead body which belongs to the plaintiff as next of kin vest such property in
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him as will sustain this action? He has
no absolute property in the remains for it
is not the subject of ownership. But the
right to care fur and bury the body of the
deceased includes the right to have possession of it. This is true, but it does not follow that the action of replevin must
be enlarged to meet the exigencies of this
case, orif it were, that it would necessarily
enforce the plaintiff's rights, or that he
has no remedy if he fails in this.
Replevin was invented to enable a person who has property in goods to recover
possession of such goods specifically.
There is nothing to show that the law ever
intended it as a means to recover that
which is not the subject of property even
where the person claiming is charged with
a duty in regard to the matter in dispute
which can only be exercised by his having
possession. The fact that possession is indispensable in order that the plaintiff may
take care of the dead body and bury it is
an objection to the remedy sought. If
this action were proper, the defendant, if
he saw fit, might give a claim property
bond and by this means retain possession
and make any disposition of the corpse he
desired, and so far as this action goes, the
law would be powerless to interfere with
any thing he did. The possibility that
the possession of a dead man's body
should depend on the willingness or ability
of an intruder to give a bond which would
practically enable him to dispose of it contrary to the judgment and wishes of the
next of kin, shows how ineffectual and objectionable this remedy might be. In controversies between the husband or wife
and next of kin as to the right of burial of
the deceased relative, the plaintiff sought
relief in a Court of Equity to restrain the
defendant from interfering with the right
to have the body for the purpose of burial,
and nowhere is it stated that a Court of
Equity would decline to interfere in a
proper case. Commonwealth v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 5 Kulp 195; Cooney v.
Lawrence, 11 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 81; Fox v •
Gordon, 16 Phila. 185. There can be no
doubt that a decree of an Equity Court
restraining the defendant from interfering
with the plaintiff in the care and burial
of the body would be simple, prompt and
effectual in maintaining plaintiff's rights.
Believing that the plaintiff cannot

maintain this action because he has no
property in the subject matter; that the action would not certainly enforce his rights
as to the body, and that he would have
a complete remedy in equity, judgment
is rendered for the defendant.
SAMUEL E. BASEHORE, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
A careful consideration of this case has
convinced us that the judgment of the
learned court of Common Pleas must be
affirmed. The action is replevin. To
maintain it, it is necessary that there
should be a right in the plaintiff, of present possession of the subject of the action,
of which right the possession of the defendant is a violation.
1. Conceding that somebody other
than Abram Ewing has the right of present possession, who is it? The plaintifflis
a brother. But, has he a right to the possession ? Is there a wife of the deceased?
A father or mother? Are there other
brothers? What fact, if any, is it that
has conferred on William Oren the right
of possession? We discover none.
2. Replevin, so far as we have discovered, is confined to attempts to recover the
possession of personal property. We have
heard no consideration suggested, that
would convince us that William Oren had
any property in the dead body of his
brother. Cases and text writers cited by
the learned court deny that a corpse can
be the subject of property even of a wife,
or husband, a parent or child-a fortiori
can it not be of a brother or more distant
relative.
3. We feel the force of the suggestion
that the law ought to concede, and it in
fact does concede a quasi ownership in
a corpse to nearly related persons, and
there might be cases An which it would be
convenient to employ the action of replevin in the vindication of this ownership. The research of the counsel and the
learned court below, and our own, have
failed to discover any instance of the extension of this remedy to the deprivation
of the possession of a dead body. The
more flexible and adaptable procedure of
equity is, we think ample to accomplish
all that replevin could possibly accomplish.
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Of course, if there is no property in a
dead body, there is no common law right
of lien upon it, by an undertaker, for services performed upon it, especially if these
services were not performed at the instance
of one having the right of custody of the
dead. Abram Ewing has no right to retain the corpse for the sordid object of enforcing compensation to himself for work
which, so far as appears, was done on his
own initiative. But the plaintiff recovers
in replevin not because the defendant has
no right, but because he himself has a right
to the possession of the thing, and the
thing is in the nature of property.
Judgment affirmed.

2. There is an equitable conversion.
K otz's Estate, 190 Pa. 152; McWilliams'
Appeal, 117 Pa. 111; Thonman's Estate,
161 Pa. 444; Irwin v. Patchen, 164 Pa. 151.
3. The Act ofJune 8, 1893, 1 P. &L. 1434,
does not apply. The mortgage and judgment must be allowed. A trust arises in
favor of creditors from the death of decedent. McWilliams' Appeal, supra;Klotz's
Appeal, sup-a; ]MeMurry's Adm's., 43 Pa.
468.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

One of the cardinal rules for the construction of wills is, that the intention of
the testator must be gathered from the
four corners of the will, or from the will as
a whole.
The clause, "I direct that my executor
shall sell my land within two years after
JAMES PIERCE'S ESTATE.
ITE.
my death, and out of the proceeds pay all
debts not paid from other sources," clearly
Distribution.-.quitableconversion.
directs, I think, without any contingencies, that the real estate is to be sold, and
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
the proceeds of sale appropriated to the
payment of debts not already paid. "A
Pierce died January 17, 1897, leaving a
mere naked power to sell real estate does
will, which contained the following: "I
not operate as a conversion of it into perdirect that my executor shall sell my land
sonalty, but such power, coupled with a
within two years after my death, and out
direction or command to sell, will have
of the proceeds pay all debts not paid from
No sale was made till that effect. If a testator authorizes his
other sources."
October 11, 1899. The fund produced by executor to sell real estate, and to execute
and deliver to purchasers deeds in fee simthe sale is $4,250. The debts of Pierce are a
ple of the same, as in this case, and it is
judgment of $220 recovered in his lifetime;
clear from the face of his will that it was
a bond for $450; a store account of $175 ; a
mortgage of $400. The owners of these the intention that the power so conferred
by him should be exercised, it will be condebts claim the proceeds. Pierce's legatees
of the residue of the estate, after paying strued as a direction to sell, and operate as
an equitable conversion."
debts, resist payment to the creditors
all
The court is of the opinion that the
before the auditor, who reports against
the debts, except the judgment and mort- clause stated above is purely a direction
and command to sell, and that the same
gage.
works an equitable conversion of the
O'KEEFE and SLOAN for the legatees.
realty. Fahnestock v. Fahnestock, 152
1. The bond and store account were liens
Pa. 56; Klotz's Estate, 190 Pa. 152; McWilon the real estate for two years, and as no
recovery was had within the limited time, liam's Appeal, 117 Pa. 111; Parkinson's
an action will not lie against an heir or
Appeal, 32 Pa. 455.
legatee. Act 1893, P. L. 392; 1 P. & L.
Therefore, the will must be construed as
1433; Kemper v. Hoch, 1 Watts 9.
to sell, and the real estate at
a
direction
2. The direction to convert realty into.
testator must be treated as
death
of
the
personalty must be positive and explicit,
and independent of all discretion. Arre- personalty. Parkinson's Appeal, 32 Pa.
walt's Appeal, 42 Pa. 414; McClure's Ap- 455; Tomman's Estate, 161 Pa. 444.
peal, 72 Pa. 414; Becker's Estate, 150 Pa.
The Act of June 8, 1893, 1 P. & L. 1434,
524.
does
not apply in this case, and a trust
creditors.
for
the
BOWERs
and
SEBRING
arises in favor of the creditors.
1. A sale after the time specified in a
It plainly appears that to give effect to
will is legal. Fahnestock v. Fahnestock,
material provisions of the will the sale
152 Pa. 56.
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must take place, and the fact of it having
been sold after the time prescribed by the
testator does not change its effect. Equity
presumes the sale to have taken place, and
an equitable conversion. The sale is also
legal. Fahnestock v. Fahnestock, 152 Pa.
St. 56.
Of the judgment and mortgage there
appears to be no contention, and since the
Act of June 8, 1893, does not apply, they
will be allowed.

Of the other debts of Pierce, the~re are a
bond for $450, a store account of $175. The
fund produced by the sale is $4,250; and,
treating this as personalty, the remaining
debts, I think, which the legatees report
against before the auditor, should also be
allowed. The court, therefore, directs that
all claims be allowed.
MILES H. MuIlB, J.

